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31 August 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
THROUGH : Deputy Director for Intelligence *pse*
SUBJECT : Comments on "US At Crossroads in
India-Pakistan Policy", by Selig
Harrison--Washington Post, 29 Aug 65

1. In response to your request, we have studied Selig Harrison's article on US policy alternatives in South Asia. It is a cogent and thoughtful analysis of a very complex problem, and we generally agree with Harrison's conclusions. He knows the country and has had long experience there; he appears, moreover, to have been well briefed.

2. Some analysts would perhaps posit yet a fourth alternative: a policy of getting tough with both sides, using our aid leverage to get them to come to terms over Kashmir and their other problems. We believe--and Harrison would probably agree--that this is merely a variation of his disengagement alternative, since the implicit threat involved in such a policy would be one of disengagement.

3. There are several small factual errors or errors of emphasis in Harrison's piece, although they do not affect his conclusions. Among these is his comparison of the Pakistani F-86 and the inferior Indian Mystere IV; the first-line Indian fighter is actually the Hawker Hunter, which is more comparable to the F-36. Another is his overdrawing of Pakistan's

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armored superiority; Pakistan does enjoy a qualitative superiority in medium tanks which is unlikely to be reduced by India's acquisition of Soviet light tanks, but the superiority is not as marked as he states. We also have a fundamental reservation about the possibility of any tacit US-Soviet arms freeze, such as Harrison mentions, in the present state of US-Soviet relations.

/s/

[redacted] for

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R. J. SMITH
Director of Current Intelligence

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